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To cite this article: Nicki Kindersley (2017): Subject(s) to control: post-war return migration and state-building in 1970s South Sudan, Journal of Eastern African Studies, DOI: [10.1080/17531055.2017.1305678](https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2017.1305678)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2017.1305678>



Published online: 31 Mar 2017.



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Subject(s) to control: post-war return migration and state-building in 1970s South Sudan

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ABSTRACT

This article looks at the history of post-war state-building in South Sudan through a study of one of the region's many return migration projects. South Sudan was arguably the subject of the first state-led mass repatriation campaign of twentieth-century Africa, after the first civil war that escalated in 1963 and ended in 1972 with the Addis Ababa Agreement. Using archival material from the newly reformulated South Sudan National Archives in Juba, this paper examines this comparatively forgotten post-war return and reconstruction project in South Sudan from 1969 to 1974. In this period, civil war ideas, staff, and techniques were recycled into an apparently benevolent and 'peace-building' project of Relief, Repatriation and Rehabilitation. The returns management project set out where the returning citizens of Sudan should go, how they should settle, live, and relate to the state. This study argues that this project developed and entrenched particular wartime state ideas of its imagined South Sudanese population, and the nature of its compact with its society. It argues for a longer view of the continuities of war- and peacetime population control, as a way to explore postcolonial ideas of 'good government'. The return and resettlement period also demonstrates the South Sudanese populations' expanding repertoire of engagement as post-war citizens: return migration and resettlement projects are good opportunities for people to reformulate their skills and tactics of negotiating, approaching, cheating, and avoiding a 'new' state.

ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 28 November 2016
Accepted 6 March 2017

KEYWORDS

Displacement; return migration; post-war reconstruction; citizenship; South Sudan

This article looks at one of the first state-led mass repatriation campaigns of twentieth-century Africa, after Sudan's first civil war ended in 1972. The civil war was brutal, particularly for the non-combatant population. Over the seven years after national independence in 1956, the postcolonial state's relationship with its southern region's residents degenerated into full-blown war. Successive civil and military regimes maintained an escalatory tit-for-tat conflict with the loosely affiliated southern rebel bands collectively known as the Anyanya, particularly in Sudan's far south and south-western territories. The 1972 Addis Ababa Accord, negotiated between the Sudan Government under Gaffar Nimeiri and the unified Anyanya command under General Joseph Lagu, opened the way for a southern Sudan regional administration, and the mass return of about

half a million southern residents forced out of their homes: based on the disputed 1973 census figures for South Sudan, this was roughly 20% of the population.

This generally forgotten post-war return project is a route to exploring the history of peri-war nation building. State authorities put forward visions of their geography, powers, and understanding of their citizenry through their programmes of large-scale repatriation. Using archival material from the newly revived South Sudan National Archives in Juba, this study demonstrates how civil war ideas, staff, and techniques were reconfigured into the 'peace-building' project of Relief, Repatriation and Rehabilitation (RRR). This project did not create a radical new vista for a post-war state, but instead developed and entrenched wartime state ideas of its own power, its imagined civic population, and its understanding of its compact with this citizenry.

This RRR period also demonstrates South Sudan's post-war population's own developing repertoire of engagement as citizens. These resettlement projects were (and are) opportunities for people to practice and refine their methods of managing, evading, and manipulating a supposedly 'new' post-war state, and for the state and population to contest a language of good government and good citizenship. In its last section, this article picks up Emma Hunter's recent call for studies that 'explore changing modes of engagement between governed and governors'.¹ This study continues Cherry Leonardi and Christopher Vaughan's history of the colonial politics of citizenship into the postcolonial period, beginning to trace popular multilinguality in local and trans-local discourses of citizenship, rights, and claim-making into the postcolonial period. South Sudan's archive holdings grow massively over 1971–1974, as southern regional government offices expanded their bureaucratic aims and processes, and as increasing numbers of returning residents made written and oral complaints and appeals. These end-of-war files are compilations of various ideas of state authority, law, and power in multiple registers. The brief exploration of these holdings here further demonstrates Leonardi and Vaughan's point that citizenship politics is central to state formation.²

This study builds on a current historical turn in migration research.³ Migration and humanitarian studies literature has only recently started to explore the roots of migration and development theory in practice.⁴ This is particularly true for research on repatriation and resettlement post-conflict, a practical discipline growing alongside the rise of humanitarianism over the 1990s, as the idea became common policy under the UN High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) 'decade of repatriation'.⁵ This study takes histories of migration back to the 1960s and 1970s, and into wider political and discursive context. It is not a comparative history, but written with an eye towards continuing practices of peri- and post-conflict migration management today. South Sudan's citizenry continues to be repatriated, relocated, and reconstructed, practically and conceptually; in the conclusion, I make some notes on the 2005–2011 post-war return migration project leading to South Sudan's referendum on independence, and on current discussions of population displacement and control.

From 'peace' to peace: wartime return projects

In general, conflict and post-conflict studies either assume (or are subject to the powerful structuring effect of) a path determinism of war-to-peace: from conflict resolution, to peace agreement, to resettlement, reintegration, and post-crisis reconstruction. Refugee

returns are often held as symbolic of this teleology: as Jeffrey Crisp explains, ‘the voluntary repatriation and effective reintegration of uprooted people [is] an important manifestation of the transition to political stability and human security ... it represents a very tangible form of progress’.⁶

But antagonists consistently blur lines between war and peace throughout civil conflicts, and return and resettlement projects are also wartime tools. Sudan’s pre-, colonial, and postcolonial regimes and armed agents have a long heritage of violently manipulating local populations, and the first postcolonial civil war was no exception. As conflict escalated over 1956–1963, government forces and guerrilla fighters engaged in escalating cycles of punitive raiding and collective retribution against local populations across greater Equatoria, and increasingly in Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal.⁷ At the same time, though, successive Sudan governments repeatedly asserted ceasefires, declared amnesties and demobilisation projects, entreated refugees and internally displaced people to return, and announced projects of ‘post-war’ civic reconstruction – from 1964 onwards.⁸ A near-continuous amnesty was in force from 9 June 1969, following Gaffar Nimeiri’s coup; Nimeiri declared this amnesty at the same time as massively increasing the scale, military equipment, and violence of the civil war in the south.⁹

The amnesty declaration on 9 June also created a Ministry for Southern Affairs (MSA), initially under the directorship of Joseph Garang, a southern Sudanese Communist Party member and experienced politician.¹⁰ The MSA’s peace-building and returns work began during this intensification of mass violence and displacement. The main agents of this work were appointees known variously as peace officers, liaison officers for peace, or peace observers, working within local governments across the southern regions.¹¹ These peace officers were part of the amnesty law, intended – according to southern politician Abel Alier, speaking as Vice President and Minister of State for Southern Affairs to the post-peace agreement Relief and Resettlement Conference on 21 February 1972 –

to encourage those refugees who wanted to return home but feared to do so, to come back without fear of prosecution for any crimes committed during the disturbances. ... To help convey this to the refugee, Peace Officers were appointed in the various provinces, and peace delegates were also sent out to visit refugees in the neighbouring countries and explain to them the new policy and tell them they were free to come home in safety.¹²

The files of the Ministry, as well as missionary correspondence from refugee camps in Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR), document repeated missions both within southern Sudan and across the borders. Peace officers and their delegations were engaged from 1969 in touring districts and provinces to proclaim the amnesty and convince people to return home. As one Liaison Officer for Peace explained in January 1970: ‘my main work is to go to the villages in the rural areas, to preach to the outlaws, to come home for peace’.¹³

These were attempts to win hearts and minds, and to monitor them. A Western Equatoria peace officer, reporting on a visit to the borders of DRC, explained that he went

firstly to assess the attitude of the Southerners outside ... [and] to observe their feelings about returning to the Sudan. Secondly, I was to observe the morale of both armed and unarmed Southerners there ... to gauge the magnitude of rebel activities inside the Congo, to find out their sources of supplies.¹⁴

Internal MSA correspondence regarding a delegation to Uganda literally underlined the need to convince ‘the DIE-HARDS’ of the ‘new policy for the south’.¹⁵ MSA officials discussed possible large-scale repatriation projects with UNHCR in CAR in June 1970, a year and a half before the Addis Ababa Agreement – despite major rebel and government army attacks and atrocities against civilians along the borders with CAR and Uganda at the same time, for instance the massacre of 28 people by an armed group (allegedly the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)), who were roped together, shot, and burnt to death inside a church at Bamga in July 1970.¹⁶

Very few people actually returned from displacement or abroad in this period. The few self-declared returnees in MSA paperwork and ‘flimsy files’ (carbon copies of correspondence usually removed from main files) over 1969–1972 were generally literate men and some women who returned to southern Sudan in the hope of resuming previous low-level civil service employment. These returnees were often heavily frustrated in their re-induction into regional government:

Frankly speaking, one was convinced beyond belief at the downfall of the military regime and the immediate announcement of the General Amnesty ... that things were quite different in the country.¹⁷

The other returnees are more dubious. MSA internal statistics, where they were maintained, show dozens to a few hundred people moving into western and central Equatoria; these numbers are likely a combination of fiction, forced displacement, or resettlement by the SAF or one of a number of rebel factions, or agricultural migrants on the porous and mostly uncontrolled mountain and forest borderlands. This is true also of the few documents detailing rebel surrenders under the amnesty: a Peace and Security Report for Bahr el Ghazal Province in May 1970 asserted that 1200 ‘registered outlaws ... surrendered for peace’ and received amnesty law certificates; however, they turned in only 15 locally made guns.¹⁸

Despite the possibly peace-minded intentions of some of these low-level officers and administrators, their amnesty and return migration work was a gloss on state tactics of population control and counter-insurgency. Their supposed beneficiaries and local partners were well aware of this: on 28 December 1971, Chief Andrea Bol Aneil asked the Inspector of Local Government and a peace officer in Aweil why the amnesty continued to be extended, ‘because the present revolutionary government is [more] interested in outlaws than the ordinary people’.¹⁹ For the Sudan government, refugee returns work meshed well with (and provided a humanitarian front for) the forced encampment, relocation, and collective violence against the southern population, all common tactics to isolate and undermine support and supply routes for the rebels by 1971.²⁰ Defining a civilian population was more important rhetorically than practically, for both the Anyanya and the Sudan government: the apolitical refugee victims of the war were those who could be encouraged or forced to move; outlaws and rebel/government sympathisers were those who refused this offer of ‘peace’. As one regional representative wrote to the MSA in February 1971:

the task of peace is pretty expensive, because there are only two major ways of getting information from the ordinary average person. One is to intimidate him by torture and the other is to entertain him. As a peace maker, the first method is out of my line, although from the financial aspect it is the cheaper of the two.²¹

Peacetime reforms?

The negotiation and declaration of the Addis Ababa Accord peace agreement and the installation of a southern regional administration in Sudan in early 1972 changed the scale of the regional government's engagement in population management, rather than the tone of it. In practice, the massive humanitarian refugee returns project following the peace agreement was not distinct from wartime population control: the local government inspector for Juba District observed in October 1972 that the 'Reception, Relief, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement of Returnees became effective and serious after Addis Ababa Accord' – but that it did not begin in peacetime.²²

Civil war ideas, staff, and techniques were recycled into the Relief, Repatriation, and Rehabilitation Commission (RRRC), established under the peace agreement in 1972. The RRRC's remit was the monitoring and assistance of returning refugees and displaced people, and the design and management of explicitly short-term projects for emergency relief that carried on from the existing work of UN agencies.²³ Planning began in earnest with the International Conference on Resettlement and Rehabilitation in Khartoum over 21–22 February 1972, and with funding meetings with Oxfam, UNHCR, the International Council of Voluntary Agencies, and other non-governmental aid agencies across Europe.²⁴ The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) committed US \$600,000 for returnee health services, and continued its existing programmes with a total budget of US\$2.34 million.²⁵ The World Council of Churches (WCC) and Sudan Council of Churches set up a Churches' Relief and Rehabilitation Committee from Juba; the Catholic Relief Services also signed a bilateral agreement with the Sudan government.²⁶ The High Executive Council for the southern region set out a total budget of US \$17.715 million for the year starting July 1972.²⁷ This patchwork of funding was supposedly directed by the government's summary plans for relief and reconstruction – colloquially called the Pink Book and the Yellow Book – despite Save the Children Fund (SCF) internal correspondence noting that the figures and costs were badly thought through and massively underfunded.²⁸

This particular 'Southern problem' continued to be dealt with by the bureaucrats and politicians of the civil war and pre-war.²⁹ Many of the southern officials who were hired into the shoestring regional bureaucracy, particularly from 1971 onwards, were being hired back in: the surviving employment files of logistics staff, stores administrators, and resettlement officers for the RRRC, World Food Programme (WFP), and local government show that they were trained by and had often worked in the colonial and post-colonial governments.³⁰ With the peace agreement in January 1972, the language changed (from 'surrenders' into 'returns', for example), but these pre-peace agreement tactics, personnel, forms, files, and ideas continued.³¹

Often, these politicians and civil servants understood themselves as the 'Southern intellectuals', responsible for, but not necessarily answerable to, the population of the southern region.³² Their approach to project management remained in the image of the postcolonial Sudanese vision of 'bureaucracy and modernism': as Leander Schneider observes of postcolonial Tanzania, this 'constructed the state [as] the only authority competent to make judgments about the lives of a "backward" population'.³³ As a counterbalance to often Arabist, racist readings of 'the Southern problem', many of these administrators took up this paternalistic view of their responsibilities for their apparently tribalised,

uneducated, politically passive (or ignorant), and fundamentally rural proletariat; an understanding strongly reminiscent of old colonial anthropology.³⁴ This approach was echoed by their expatriate administrative counterparts in aid organisations and the UN, which – according to a British Embassy observer – suffered from ‘too much of the underlying missionary spirit, ministering “to the ignorant and incapable natives who simply get in the way but must be looked after”’.³⁵ As in Uganda, southern administrators were confident in their statistically grounded knowledge of the right way to work: ‘government officers were confident that they had much to teach their constituents’.³⁶ For the returns and reintegration programme, this meant a pedagogical effort by the two key categories of intermediaries in the south, the chiefs and the students, who would be guided to ‘enlighten [the people] on the necessity of living in big villages which will be the result of Resettlement’.³⁷ Ambrose Wol, then Regional Director for National Guidance, wrote to his Undersecretary Brigadier Omer Mohed Said in 1970, ‘our people need re-educating’.³⁸

Rural return to a tribal ‘home’

Their plans followed the pattern of refugee assistance critiqued famously by Barbara Harrell-Bond in 1985: of initial relief aid and counting the population, and transport from refugee camps to reception camps; then the provision of land, tools, seeds, and primary education; and finally the withdrawal of aid when recipients are rightfully self-sufficient and integrated.³⁹ The RRRC’s repatriation plan appears straightforward, rational, and managed, and echoes almost exactly the outline of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and UNHCR’s managed returns model used from 2005 to 2011:

The plan basically calls for a very accurate census to portray the number of potential returnees. The plan then aims at setting up reception centres [to] receive and cater for the refugees for a period of up to a week, after which the returnee is transported to his previous village.⁴⁰

After this, each adult returnee was to be given one and a half Sudanese pounds, some clothes and a blanket, and cooking utensils for each family unit; they would be (in theory) supported with food aid by the WFP for 18 months.⁴¹ This reintegration would be supported with extensive projects of education, health, and transport reconstruction.⁴²

These plans were premised on a particular understanding of the southern Sudanese population. At the core of resettlement planning was the essential idea that people would ‘go home’. These homes were specifically rural; as in the recent IOM repatriation programme of 2005–2011, people’s ‘home village’ and ‘home area’ were registered, and became their ‘final destination’.⁴³ This continued a long colonial legacy of anti-urbanisation and population control in the south, as authorities sought to minimise urban centres’ creation of a population they saw as dangerously ‘detribalised’.⁴⁴ The Local Government Act 1971 allowed local orders from People’s Executive Councils to control the movement of ‘idlers’ and ‘social parasites’, adding this paperwork into colonial files labelled ‘Undesirables’.⁴⁵ RRRC and WFP assistance focused on villages, hoping ‘to make life in the Village more attractive and keep the returning population on the land’.⁴⁶ Model farms and road maintenance projects partly justified this forced ruralisation of urban returnees. In April 1973, the Equatoria Province authorities were ‘discussing with the Chiefs to remove the idle people from the town [of Juba] to go home and resettle in their villages and cultivate’.⁴⁷ Demolition campaigns in Juba suburbs followed.⁴⁸

Wartime peace villages

The most explicit form of this continuing idea of ‘home villages’ was the on-going villa-gisation programme – during the war, known as ‘peace villages’, ‘resettlement villages’, or ‘peace camps’, and after the peace agreement in 1972, more commonly termed ‘model villages’.⁴⁹ Peace villages were a wartime tactic used since at least 1966, to cut local supply lines and recruitment to the Anyanya guerrilla groups, and as a gloss on the government’s forced population movement, encampment, and systematic violence against civilians. The Information and Social Affairs Mission to Bahr el Ghazal in 1966 explained that people would settle in the peace camps to ‘perform their normal duties’, under ‘a special committee for repatriation of the refugees’.⁵⁰ The plans generally were, as a northern official put it mildly in mid-1969,

to collect all the villages in the forests and situate them near the communication roads and supply them with necessary services, such as a police station, sanitary outpatients [clinic], schools; thus [this] will avoid the reason [for] the escape of those hinderers [*sic*] and keep peace to the inhabitants, who will avoid the shots of the rifles between the police and the govt. hinderers.⁵¹

This was significantly more forcible than these documents articulated. Anyanya propa-ganda, seeing these camps and settlements as human shields for government troops, described how victims of army and rebel attacks on villages were frequently ‘resettled’ by the state ‘into the so called “peace zones”’.⁵² These were intended, as an anonymous correspondent to the rebel politician Joseph Oduho explained in June 1966,

- a) to make propaganda to the world that everything is normal, though there will not be any thing called normal. Because who is going to see that these will have to be really peace zones and not trap zones?
- b) to brain-wash the people for election that should only be for unionists parties.
- c) to isolate the FF [Freedom Fighters] from the people so that they people may not help the FF.
- d) to mow the people [*sic*] in such a way that no body escape as a refugee to tell the story to the world.⁵³

In early 1970, the Juba Statistics Office was specially tasked with enumerating and conducting censuses of the peace camps. After three months, and with very little information returned from Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal Provinces, they reported that Juba Rural Council had created 5 camps; Tonj and Wau Town together controlled 8; and Upper Nile Province collectively ran 12.⁵⁴ Further peace camps were proposed across the southern region, partly because ‘present peace villages are so overcrowded’.⁵⁵ Scopas Poggio, in one of the only histories of the first civil war written to date, notes that each man in these wartime peace villages was supposedly given four Sudanese pounds to build a family house, food rations for the first season, and seeds – a very similar provision, albeit a better financial deal, to the post-1972 RRRC support package.⁵⁶

These camps gradually became ‘model villages’ in government documents by late 1971.⁵⁷ Resettlement villages were officially planned at the Sudan Resettlement Conference in Khartoum in February 1972, and were supported and funded by the WFP, WCC, SCF, and UNHCR:

The Commission on Resettlement has worked out a broad plan for the establishment of some forty 'model' villages to absorb returnees from the 'bush' as well as refugees returning from neighbouring countries ... It is envisaged that each village will accommodate some 500 families, or approximately 2500 persons, and will include essential services.⁵⁸

These grew directly from wartime peace camps: Bishop Allison of the Anglican mission recommended that SCF work in Yei partly because 'it was a government Peace Camp housing some 4/5000 people and therefore has a nucleus for an expanding population'.⁵⁹ The villages were intended 'to absorb idle people who are presently in peace centres, those returning from the bush and neighbouring countries into Agriculture', with an emphasis on returning to pre-war rural living, to 'resume normal life'.⁶⁰

The regional ministries and Resettlement Commission set out a particular vision of normal life through these model villages. The 1970s repatriation projects – like their later versions from 2005–2011 – emphasised returning people to what the administrators and community coordinators understood as their 'ethnic territory', through noting a returnees' ethnicity, clan, paternal village, and the chief they lived under. A notice from Yambio Rural Council declared that 'all the people ... are to move to their previous residential areas', especially those who had moved to government and market quarters, to live in teak plantations, in rebel areas, and 'any other places which was not demarcated or allocated for residential areas' during the war.⁶¹ In 1972, chiefs were specifically 'transported' to their villages, and returnees were told to 'report' to their chiefs:⁶²

the policy is to encourage returnees to settle in their original homes; any restrictions which may discourage them from settling should not be imposed on them ... provided they do not do so on somebody's site.⁶³

These plans were a continuation, and entrenchment, of colonial and postcolonial constructions of the southern population as ethnically bounded to primordial tribal territories, and politically structured according to chiefs: as Leonardi observes, 'people needed to be tied to chiefs to prevent scattering and chaos'.⁶⁴ This history demonstrates Ferenc Marko's recent point that South Sudanese citizenship is primarily defined ethnically: but it also evidences the long roots of this 'ethnic turn' of post-2011 national citizenship law and practice.⁶⁵ Recent research on Anyanya and Sudan government records from the first civil war over 1963–1972 has shown how both sides attempted to fix local populations to ethnic territories, often violently – for instance with the Anyanya groups in Eastern Equatoria demanding that local ethnic communities support specific rebel commanders, dividing up populations and military/political authority according to an imagined patchwork of ethnic 'home areas'.⁶⁶

Struggles over the utility and risks of tying personal belonging and identification, legitimate residence, and political representation to a specific, aggregated ethnicity and supposedly clear ethnic territory are a key theme in the history of South Sudanese political thought, standing in tension with ideas of individual citizen's rights to representation and mobility across a horizontal national landscape, and at odds with old local practices of pastoral migration, resettlement, and inter-relationships.⁶⁷ The RRRC's imagining of the post-war topography of resettlement and rights continued this prioritisation of political tribalism.

Resettlement in practice

The RRRC's organisational and statistical plans were wildly beyond local authorities' actual powers to administrate. In August 1972, a frustrated RRRC official complained that 'there are no organised offices of Resettlement to be found anywhere in the whole of Western Equatoria', and that 'proper statistics of returnees have not been kept'.⁶⁸ Much like in 2011, the progress of repatriation was measured against a projected total figure for those internally and externally displaced by the war, with total 'returnees' being subtracted from an original estimate: 'like everyone else ... Embassy staff suggest different figures for numbers of refugees returning (n.b. this includes D.P's [displaced persons]) but between one and two m. [million] is the general opinion'.⁶⁹ By the end of 1972, figures being sent back to the WFP were estimates based on extrapolation from a handful of registration exercises, 'by sheer deduction'.⁷⁰

The SSNA documents also do not demonstrate any clear processes on the ground; at most, they show the limited reach of the peacetime government. Most people who intended to come back to Sudan independently returned by mid-1973.⁷¹ The 'main' reception centres at Nimule, Kaya, and Lasu were in practice 'a small hut', with 'a local committee'.⁷² The principal impact of the RRRC and WFP projects was the disbursement of cash, food, and tools; an uneven, not necessarily well targeted, and often poorly managed process that resulted in some stores containing only cooking oil, or entirely rotten grain.⁷³ Distribution of the quantities of food aid that did make it outside of the stores at Juba was dependent on the local organisational powers of individual WFP and RRRC employees, chiefs, teachers and teacher-parent associations, women's unions, priests, and students, with concomitant tensions over distribution and corruption.⁷⁴

This alternative history is starkly at odds with the rhetoric of the returns project. But regardless of the explicit failings of the RRRC, the planning and paperwork (and the possibility of 'Resettlement and Reintegration') was significant in framing a peacetime state and society.⁷⁵ The post-peace regional government was materialised by statistical imagination and grand projects that demanded people speak its language, use its categories, and perform its bureaucracy, regardless of local effect or effectiveness.

New citizens and claiming the state

Communities and individuals have made direct appeals to the government as citizens, claiming rights and demanding the state adhere to its own laws, since the early colonial period. Many of their tactics used to negotiate the RRRC were long-standing: V.N.G. Loro, the Local Government Inspector for Juba, complained in April 1972 that 'the people of Torit District are pouring in to Juba claiming to be returning from Uganda. This is very difficult to [dis]prove'.⁷⁶

But return to southern Sudan in the early 1970s, even if unassisted by the RRRC, provided one of the first widespread opportunities for increasingly literate postcolonial populations to make claims on their 'new' state. In the SSNA, while there are district and province-level files filled with such complaints and demands stretching back to the 1920s, these files multiply hugely from 1971 onwards. This could be due to the vagaries of filing and termites, but as well as formal complaint files, surviving flimsy files document this proliferation of appeals, complaint letters and petitions – and concomitantly, the

increasingly southern-staffed regional government's filing of these demands, and sometimes their responses. As with the letters from the 1930s to the 1950s, it is hard to tell whether the chiefs and students often signing these letters on behalf of a wider constituency really had one; but many are collective petitions, with dozens of signatures and thumbprints in ink. Many are also transcriptions of oral complaints brought to offices, and thus not only a sample of local (male) literati with access to pen and paper.⁷⁷ They evidence the opportunities for door-stepping that the re-opening of district-level peacetime government offices brought, and their petitioners' wartime experience of negotiating national and international refugee laws, bureaucracy, and languages.

These letter-writers demanded that the Sudanese state live up to its own rhetoric of peace, even during the civil war. In 1970, after Nimeiri's coup and his declaration of a socialist revolution, the newly reorganised Lou Student Union, Akobo Teachers' Representative, and Akobo Officials Union wrote collectively to the new president, on the basis that his declared 'new phase' after the revolution – which should have brought 'radical change' – was not forthcoming in Akobo. 'If such a climate continues, the people of that District will be deprived of their inalienable rights offered by their mighty Revolution'. They complained specifically of

... the abominable acts committed by the Police. They have instilled fear and anxiety in the hearts of the Citizens by wilfully threatening to covet girls and women in their decent homes. ... We believe in a Government which follows democratic practices and recognises the right to live.⁷⁸

These letters demonstrate the wide reach of democratic and legal discourse, and a working knowledge of the terms and terminology of Nimeiri's revolution; letter-writers were swift to pick up the Nimeiri regime's socialist language of comradeship.

These petitions were demanding to see what peace actually meant in practice for the rights of citizens and responsibilities of the state. Fabio Nyikuai, a junior clerk before the war, started his letter of June 1972: 'I am hereby begging for what I believe to be part of my official right'.⁷⁹ Nyikuai was charged in 1964 for subversion, under the emergency provisions of the Defence Act 1958, and sentenced to five years' imprisonment by a court martial; he was claiming his official right to be reinstated to his former position, under the amnesty declared later in 1964. This post-war right to demand that the state adhere to its own peace- and wartime laws is made explicit in another appeal to Abel Alier: 'now, I think, I have the right to ask for settling my case finally, and thanks'.⁸⁰ The Anuak Southern Sudanese Refugees in Gambella, writing collectively with a list of names and thumbprints to the Chairman of the RRRC in August 1972, explained:

We ... feel greatly honoured to be able to submit this short report to you as free citizens of the Sudan. It is not presumptuous that we as a part of Sudan nation should approach our nation and leaders, nor is it unseemingly [sic] that we should state to our Government the role we should now be playing in the building up of the nation.⁸¹

Repeated amnesties, declarations of peace, and 'new' governments gave constituents renewed opportunities to demand their new rights as citizens; while their rhetoric was idealistic, their specific demands addressed local realities of fragmented and violent government. And while returning residents used this language of citizenship, democracy, and all-inclusive national law, they were also multilingual, making use of other referents and

registers to best position themselves as an authoritative ‘good citizen’.⁸² Many petitioners wrote themselves simultaneously as individual citizens claiming their legal rights, and as stalwart members of a specific ethnic and rural collective, fitting into the government’s dual imagining of both itself and its population – as a modern state with laws and rules, and as the manager of a ruralised patchwork of tribes. Successful appeals – ones which receive a response – balance the individual and collective identity of being a post-war southern citizen, managing to call on both of Mamdani’s stark categories of urban individual citizens, and rural, ethnicised and chief-led subjects.

The southern intellectuals of the post-war administration closely policed access to this discourse of citizenship. They did not necessarily deny rural residents the right to speak as citizens – as per Mamdani’s overly rigorous binary – but set the limits to what appeals could be made, and how they could be phrased, as a modern, individual Southern citizen. Many comments by government staff in the marginalia of these files sneer at what they see as the jungle legalese of overtly modernist, individualist appeals. For instance, Mica Bol Ciengau, a worker in Rumbek hospital, appealed over unequal pay in the wards: ‘I have been deprived from my ideal right as a citizen of this our beloved country the SUDAN’. A marginal note by Abel Alier, rejecting his appeal, reads: ‘he has even read a bit of Karl Marx on wages and dialectical materialism: [he quotes from Cien-gau’s letter:] “Equal pay for equal job!”’⁸³

The end of peace-building

By the end of 1973, the resettlement offices and stores were closing down, often just because supplies had been exhausted or people had moved away.⁸⁴ Reconstruction work was dogged with large scandals, such as the TECMA affair, with £164,000 Sudanese pounds invested by two ministry directors in a dodgy company for roads that were never built; the disappearance of £50,000 Sudanese pounds donated by the UNHCR for educational supplies; and the Energo Projikt’s hugely delayed and massively expensive construction of the parliament building by 1974.⁸⁵ The food aid-centred WFP Project 634 fell apart by 1975, with support being reformulated into other rural development projects because of endemic mismanagement and corrupt accounting.⁸⁶ In the district-level files, it is hard to tell what is incompetence, duplicitous reporting, or outright theft: for instance, a resettlement officer reported that the storekeeper of Juba District, with his assistants and 30 returnee residents, confronted the RRRC storekeeper and threatened him with sticks and knives until he issued 80 sacks of grain to them.⁸⁷

Despite certain dubious measures of post-conflict success – the British foreign office celebrated ‘success in political institution building’ by noting that ‘three sets of elections have been held’ – two years of peace-building started to visibly fall apart by 1974.⁸⁸ The RRRC’s closure sparked demonstrations in February by residents of the Gumbo returnee reception centre in Rejaf, by staff at Juba Civil Hospital, and labourers on the Mundri to Maridi road, among many other small protests and riots in 1974–1975, primarily over job losses and unpaid earnings.⁸⁹ The RRRC was shut down on 31 March 1974.⁹⁰ Its work was not celebrated. The near-contemporary assessment by South Sudanese academic Elias Nyamlell Wakoson called it ‘the worst-handled resettlement and rehabilitation program in the world’: ‘what happened in the southern Sudan was partial resettlement but no

rehabilitation. ... the returnees came back, resettled themselves, [and] rehabilitated themselves'.⁹¹

Conclusion

Sudan's wartime and post-war resettlement projects are, in many ways, a good example of James Scott's state: its 'efforts at sedentarization ... [were an] attempt to make a society legible, to arrange the population in ways that simplified the classic state functions of taxation, conscription, and prevention of rebellion', to clarify its subjects through mapping them in ethnically distinct villages each with a clear chiefly authority.⁹² The new regional administration was drawing Mamdani's sharp distinction between rural and urban, asserting a 'rural world of tradition and kinship' where their civilian population resided, and their ability to govern and look after it.⁹³

This research demonstrates the utility of historical explorations of mass migration and population management in examining the evolution of state imagination and citizenship politics. This RRR period allowed South Sudan's elusive and savvy population to expand its repertoire of 'citizen' engagement. The South Sudan National Archives complaints files are compilations of the renewed tactics of returning citizen-subjects, in (re-)gaining experience of negotiating a Sudanese state. Even if the state was poorly managed or near-invisible in practice, people were still revising a new discursive system: updating their vocabulary as refugees, returnees, and citizens, and working across Mamdani's sharp divide of urban citizenship and rural ethnic community.

This article traces the postcolonial roots of some contemporary norms and logics of governance in South Sudan. Wartime population controls and post-war reconstruction projects since 1969 have both centred an idea of primordial ethnic homelands, represented by chiefs and defended by locally rooted rebel (or state) forces. Marko recently argued that independent South Sudan 'reintroduce[d] ethnicity into the practice of citizenship' after independence in 2011, and thus 'returned to the colonial logic of indirect rule'; I would argue instead that local political theory has developed and evolved ideas of 'home territory' and political tribalism since the colonial period, and that these ideas have remained fundamental to conceptions of governance and citizenship for both rebel and state agents.⁹⁴

The debate over political geography and constituency in South Sudan underpins discussions of sub-division, ethnic homelands, and self-representation from the late 1970s to today, as well as more drastic deportations and forced movements of families and communities considered to be 'outside of their area' during the re-division of the Southern Region in 1983, known as the 'Kokora' period. As Lazarus Leek Mawut emphasised in 1986: 'the practice in the South is that every person must return to his roots. Thus citizens of Upper Nile must go to Upper Nile Region. The same applies to Bahr el Ghazal and Equatoria'.⁹⁵ Practices of coercive population management rooted in the first civil war, legitimated by humanitarian 'return' practices post-war, have worked to entrench the ideas that underpin calls for political sub-division and ethnic representation in South Sudan today.⁹⁶

Post-script: today's population management projects

The managerial ideas of post-conflict reconstruction and resettlement detailed here will be familiar to some readers. The massive logistical, bureaucratic, and quantitative efforts of

the UNHCR and IOM from 2005 to repatriate, resettle, and reintegrate generations of displaced South Sudanese people as a post-conflict nation-building project echo the projects of the 1970s, despite being significantly better staffed, resourced, and practically conceptualised.⁹⁷ The maps, way-stations, enumeration, and quantitative reporting of the RRR projects of 2005–2011 were burdened by the same concepts: the need to return people to (rural) ‘home areas’, in line with their ethnic origin and chiefly authorities – and, in the process, erasing or overriding personal histories of intermarriage, urbanisation, and migration, despite three decades of criticism from practitioners and scholars on the meaning and experience of return ‘home’.⁹⁸ This post-war return project received many of the same criticisms as its 1970s counterpart, not least that its data on returnee numbers were dubious, that its promises were too great, and its projects disjointed and often badly managed.⁹⁹

Like Geiger, Pécoud, and Easton-Calabria have all recently observed, historical research into past refugee and returnee projects undermines their claims to innovation.¹⁰⁰ Such projects often emphasise post-war peace and reconstruction as the antithesis of violent disorder – a shift, in common South Sudan parlance, from the bullet to the ballot, and a natural progression to rule of law and state protection: as B.S. Chimni stated, ‘of course, going back “home” also means regaining citizenship rights’.¹⁰¹

But this study emphasises that population management in Sudan is part of a wider theory of governance that spans war and peacetime, and is common to both rebels and state officials.¹⁰² Forcible relocation to ‘peace camps’ (or ‘villages’) have been a constant in Sudan’s civil war history, used perhaps most horrifically in the Nuba Mountains and across greater Kordofan in the 1990s by the Bashir regime, employing the language of refugee protection and social reconstruction to further population control, violence, and securitisation. This is one extreme of a broader history of forced movement and manipulation of populations, refugee camps or returnee groups by both Sudanese and South Sudanese government and armed forces, such as the bulldozing of irregularly settled neighbourhoods in central Khartoum and Juba over the 1960s to present.¹⁰³ Modernist, quantitative, developmentalist states have the tools to justify coercive, paternalist, and sometimes violent practices of ‘management’.¹⁰⁴ Histories of development projects demonstrate Maureen Hickey’s and Schneider’s point that development policy discourse often empowers or underpins authoritarianism.¹⁰⁵ If mass migration and return projects after civil wars are to help in ‘building nations’, or assist new residents in claiming and shaping their renewed national citizenship, it is imperative that these projects are cognisant of these historical state practices and internal logics of reconstruction.

Notes

1. Hunter, “Introduction.”
2. Leonardi and Vaughan, “We are Oppressed.”
3. Plewa, “The Effects of Voluntary Return Programmes”; Easton-Calabria, “From Bottom-Up to Top-Down.”
4. Geiger and Pécoud, “International Organisations.”
5. This body of literature still primarily focuses on factors influencing return migration, or the economic impacts and experiences of return and reintegration: see Carling, Mortensen, and Wu, “Systematic Bibliography on Return Migration” and Crisp, “Forced Displacement.”
6. Crisp, “Forced Displacement,” 17.

7. Rolandsen, "The Making of the Anya-Nya"; Poggo, *The First Sudanese Civil War*.
8. Under the Al-Khalifa, Mahgoub, and al-Mahdi civil and military administrations. Gordon Muortat, in a circulated statement, dates amnesty declarations to 1964: British National Archives (NA) Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 39.1154, 25 July 1972.
9. Arou, "Regional Devolution," 83; Poggo, *The First Sudanese Civil War*.
10. Arou, "Regional Devolution," 87.
11. See Sudan National Archives (SSNA) Ministry of Southern Affairs (MSA) 15.A.2 7123; MSA 15.A.2 7144–146; MSA 36.B.2 6175–6.
12. Save the Children Fund Archives Birmingham (SCF) A173 Sudan, 1972 January–June, 8, Address by HE Sayed Abel Alier, Vice President and Minister of State for Southern Affairs, to the Relief and Resettlement Conference, Southern Region, 21 February 1972.
13. SSNA MSA 15.A.2 47, letter from Santino Deng Teng, Liaison Officer for Peace, to the Minister of Interior, Major Farouk Osman Hamadalla, 13 January 1970.
14. SSNA MSA FF III 4977, report by Cleto H Rial, on a visit to DRC, 5 January 1971.
15. MSA FF 1970 4961, letter from Minister of Southern Affairs to Under Secretary, Ministry for Financial Affairs, Khartoum, 4 May 1970 (their emphasis).
16. For a history of this incident, see SCF A00072, UNHCR Bulletin No. 10, 10–11; Comboni Archive Rome (CAR) A107 Busta 7 doc. 3, anonymous letter to Fr. Bresciani; CAR A104 Busta 10 Doc. 10, letter from Baroco to Professor, n.d. 1970.
17. MSA 50.O.1 116, letter from John Athor Kuol to Ombudsman, Khartoum, 5 July 1971.
18. MSA 15.A.2 230, 'Peace and security reports in Bahr el Ghazal Province 1970', May 1970.
19. MSA 15.A.2 182–4, letter from Santino Deng Teng, Peace Officer for Aweil, to Commissioner of Bahr el Ghazal Province, 21 January 1971.
20. See Poggo, *The First Sudanese Civil War*.
21. MSA 36.B.3 1–3, letter from Franco Garang, Regional Representative to Bahr el Ghazal Province, to MSA, 1 February 1971.
22. Equatoria Province (EP) 35.A.2.1 III 474, Rajab Guma Wani, 'Handing over note of returnees work', for Local Government Inspector Juba District, 22 October 1972.
23. SSNA High Executive Council (HEC) 92.A.1.1 III, 8.
24. See SSNA project file EP 35.A.2 I 33; and SCF A00072 Oxfam 1965–72, 'Director's report to the executive committee', 21–22 June 1972.
25. Amounting to \$3.45m. and a total budget of \$13.47m. today; Arou, "Regional Devolution," 215–6.
26. SCF A173, UNHCR document, 19 October 1972. Funding is haphazard and hard to trace: see SSNA Equatoria Province (EP) 35.A.2.1 1972–73: 6717, letter from Toby Gooch, Field Director for Oxfam East Africa, to Peter Gatkuoth, Advisor General to MSA, 11 April 1972. UNICEF committed \$3.3m. (today \$18.99m.) over four years: SCF A173, UNICEF cabled statement Appendix D, June 1972.
27. HEC 92.A.1.1 III 234, Budget for 1 July 1972 to 30 June 1973 (today \$101.947m.).
28. SCF A173, UNHCR report, 19 October 1972; SCF A173, SCF internal notes on Pink Book.
29. For a discussion of this term, see Willis, "The Southern Problem."
30. By early 1964, many southern officials had been transferred northwards: see FCO 371 VS1017.15, SANU pamphlet, 'Imminent genocide in South Sudan,' 6 March 1964.
31. For a demonstration of this changing use in a single report, see the internal MSA document at SSNA MSA 15.A.2 7216, 230.
32. This is not a new idea; very low levels of literacy and formal education, particularly since the civil war disrupted schools, left the southern administration with a small and closely knit group of local 'elites' to draw on. See Leonardi and Vaughan, "We are Oppressed."
33. Willis, "The Southern Problem"; Schneider, "Colonial Legacies," 107–8.
34. Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, 26.
35. NA FCO 93.720, report, 'Political and economic conditions in the Southern region of the Sudan: mid-1975', 24.
36. Peterson and Taylor, "Rethinking the State," 68.

37. EP 35.A.2.1 6727, letter from V.N.G. Loro, Inspector of Local Government Juba District, to Chairman of RRRC, 13 May 1972. Also see EP 35.A.2.1 6721, Plan of Action of Lino Girikipio Wandu, Peace Officer for Tembura, 22 April 1972.
38. MSA FF 1970 4969, letter from Ambrose Wol to Brigadier Omer Mohed Said, Undersecretary for Ministry of National Guidance, 'Regional national guidance officers in the South', 18 July 1970.
39. Betts, "Zonal Rural Development," 149; Harrell-Bond, *Imposing Aid*, 10.
40. HEC 35.C.2 II 58, RRRC report, 'Repatriation of Refugees from Uganda', 21 August 1972.
41. EP 35.A.2.1 III 187, meeting minutes of RRC office, 5 May 1972; EP 35.A.2.3 II WFP 1973 173, Handing over notes from Khaham Mohamed Kharam, Inspector for Local Government Juba District, to Sayed David Koak of the WFP, 14 April 1973.
42. A critique of the processes of the RRRC is not within the remit of this article; for this, see Kibreab, *Reflections*.
43. This is a common standard for current policy on repatriation and demobilisation. See Heimerl, "The Return of Refugees" and Pantuliano, "Going Home," 3.
44. For a discussion of this colonial and postcolonial concern over the 'drift to towns', see Leonard, *Dealing with Government*, 7, 75.
45. EP 47.A.2 142, People's Executive Council Local Order on Idlers, 1971.
46. EP 35.A.2.3 II WFP 1973 173, Handing over notes from Khaham Mohamed Kharam, Inspector for Local Government Juba District, to Sayed David Koak of the WFP, 14 April 1973.
47. EP 35.A.2.1 1972-1973 354, letter from Commissioner of Equatoria Province to RRRC Chair, 10 April 1973.
48. EP 35.A.2.1 1972-1973 363, letter from Commissioner of Equatoria Province to RRRC Executive Director, 26 April 1973.
49. The idea of peace villages has a longer and broader history than can be detailed here. For lists of villages, see EP 35.A.2.3 I 1967-70 WFP 20-21, letter from Equatoria Province Headquarters to Executive Director of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 25 November 1967; and HEC 35.C.2 II 70.
50. CAR A85/9 6, Sudan Government, 'A message of peace in Bahr el Ghazal', 1966.
51. MSA 15.A.1 7266 49-50, letter from Hassan Ahmed Morgan to Southern Development Committee president and members, Khartoum, 8 August 1969.
52. CAR A86/19 6, 'Southern Sudan Information Service', 29 January 1967; also see reports in CAR A86/21/3 February-August 1968, 'Voice of Southern Sudan'.
53. CAR A104 Busta 9 33: letter from Baroco to J. Oduho, 4 June 1966.
54. A full list can be found in MSA 53.A.1.1 16, Ministry of Planning, Statistics Office Juba, Annual Report for the Year 1970/71.
55. MSA FF 1970 4962-3, letter from Magzoub Talha, Acting Inspector for Local Government in Tembura to MSA Khartoum, 23 February 1970; this was 'fairly successful', according to Clement Mboro: see Sudan Archives Durham (SAD) 919/6/3-4, Collins, 'Notes from a Conversation with Clement Mboro', n.d. c. 1970.
56. Poggo, *The First Sudanese Civil War*, 88.
57. Early 'model villages' are discussed in MSA 36.F.1 74, letter on Planning and Coordination Commission from Abel Alier to Mansour Khalid, 17 November 1971. For this changing phrasing, and village sites, see HEC 35.C.2 II 90, letter from RRRC in Juba to HEC President, 28 August 1972; and EP 35.A.2.1 1972-3 74, letter from Executive Director for Equatoria Province, Barnaba T Kisanga, to Inspector of Local Government, Torit, 22 May 1972.
58. SCF A173, report by Lt Col. R.E.S. Skelton, April 1972.
59. SCF A173 Sudan, A.P. Slogrove, 'Report on a Visit', 3 May 1972.
60. SSNA Eastern District (ED) 36.B.1 103, letter from Minister of Agriculture, Equatoria Province, to District Inspectors of Agriculture, 'Local Development Projects 1971/72 Agriculture', n.d.; EP 35.A.2 I 310, Yambio Rural Council public notice, n.d. c. 1971.
61. EP 35.A.2 I 310, Yambio Rural Council public notice, n.d. c. 1971.
62. EP 35.A.2.1 1972-3 179, Resettlement Directive No. 1 Yei River District, 14 July 1972.

63. EP 35.A.2 I 142, Commissioner for Equatoria Province to Commissioner for Yei River District, n.d. c. 1972.
64. Leonardi, *Dealing with Government*, 216.
65. Marko, "Negotiations and Morality."
66. Rolandsen and Kindersley, "They are not Forbidden from Using Violence."
67. Aalen and Schomerus, *Considering the State*; Johnson, "Federalism."
68. EP 35.A.2 I 1972-3 44, anonymous note; EP 35.A.2.1 V 104, Province Resettlement officer, 'Report on tour of Western Equatoria', 7 January 1973.
69. SCF A173, letter from A.P. Slogrove to SCF, 15 May 1972 (his emphasis).
70. EP 35.A.2 I 1972-3 44, file note, August 1972; a final report and list of returnee statistics was only forwarded by 10 October 1972.
71. Akol, "Refugee Migration"; Akol, "A Crisis of Expectations," 91.
72. HEC 35.C.2 II 6624-58, report by RRRC Juba, 'Repatriation of Refugees from Uganda', 21 August 1972.
73. EP 35.A.2.1 1972-3 344, letter from B.L. Mogga, Executive Director of the RRRC, to Executive Director for Equatoria Province, 24 March 1973.
74. EP 35.A.2.1 V 104, Province Resettlement Officer, 'Report on tour of Western Equatoria 22/12/72 to 7/1/73': 'it is the question of who should do what which is causing this confusion'. Also see reports in SSNA Eastern Equatoria Province (EEP) 35.A.2.3 V 8840-1; and at EEP 35.A.2.3 V 8845, 8899, 8902, and 8903.
75. Willis, "Peace and Order."
76. See Leonardi, *Dealing with Government*, 199; EP 35.A.2.1 III 20, N.G. Loro, Local Government Inspector Juba, to Commissioner of Equatoria Province, 28 April 1972.
77. Many of these door-stepping appeals and representations in writing are from women; scribes also write on behalf of complainants, much like the professional form-fillers working at state offices in South Sudan today.
78. MSA FF 1970 4965, Lou Student Union, Akobo Teachers Representative, Akobo Officials Union to the President, 23 May 1970.
79. HEC 92.A.1 II 235, letter of appeal from Fabio Nyikuai, junior clerk, 12 June 1972.
80. HEC 92.A.1 II 129, letter, Abdel Latif el Khalifa to Abel Alier, 18 September 1972.
81. HEC 92.A.1 II 100, Anuak Southern Sudanese Refugees in Gambella to Chairman of the RRRC, 23 August 1972.
82. See Leonardi and Vaughan, "We are Oppressed."
83. MSA 92.A.1 1970-2, letter from Mica Bol Ciengau, Rumbek Hospital worker, to MSA, 5 July 1971.
84. See correspondence at EP 35.A.2.1 VI 144.
85. Arou, "Regional Devolution," 200-2, 205; NA FCO 93.720, Report, 'Political and economic conditions in the Southern region of the Sudan: mid-1975', 15-6; EP 36.J.4 1974-5 89, African Socialist Front, Juba, 'Press Release No. 1: The Unity Day Celebrations in Wau - a review of facts about the regional government achievements and failures during the year', 25 February 1975.
86. EP 35.A.2.3 IV WFP 47, Joseph Akec Onga for the Director, Ministry of Regional Administration, to Commissioners of Provinces, 'WFP Evaluation/Reformulation mission for Project 634 "Rural Development of the South," 23rd November - 21st December 1975', 7 November 1975; EP 35.A.2.1 VI WFP 72, letter from J.P. Noblet, Senior Advisor to WFP Project 634, to Manager Akuot Atem, 'Strict compliance to WFP Project 634 Plan of Operation', 5 September 1973.
87. EP 35.A.2 I 1972-3 202, Jacob Mahd, Province regional storekeeper, to Equatoria Province Regional Officer, 29 January 1973.
88. NA FCO 93.720, Report, 'Political and economic conditions in the Southern region of the Sudan: mid-1975', 1.
89. EP 36.J.4 1973-4 369, Daily Security Reports for 7-11 February 1974.
90. EP 35.A.2.1 VI 151, letter from El Hanan Were Iyeggah, RRRC Eastern District, to Commissioner for Equatoria Province, 22 March 1974.

91. Nyamlell Wakoson, "Sudan People's Liberation Army."
92. Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, 2.
93. Leonardi, *Dealing with Government*, 148.
94. Marko, "Negotiations and Morality," 672.
95. Mawut, *The Southern Sudan*, 68.
96. Johnson, "Federalism."
97. Schulhofer-Wohl, Sambanis, and Bernadotteakademim, *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration*, 4.
98. United Nations Mission in Sudan, "Return and Reintegration Policy"; Allen and Morsink, *When Refugees Go Home*; Koser, "Return, Readmission and Reintegration."
99. Pantuliano, "Going Home," 5–6, 11–13.
100. Geiger and Pécoud, "International Organisations"; Easton-Calabria, "From Bottom-Up to Top-Down."
101. Willis, "Peace and Order," 99; Chimni, "Refugees, Return and Reconstruction," 163.
102. Day and Reno, "In Harm's Way," 106–7.
103. See Kindersley, "The Fifth Column?," Chs. 2 and 3.
104. Porter, "Making Things Quantitative," 402.
105. Hickey, "Modernisation, Migration, and Mobilisation," 1; Schneider, "Colonial Legacies," 109.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Øystein Rolandsen for a series of fruitful collaborations and conversations over 2015 and 2016 which have informed this work. An earlier version of this paper was presented at 'The Ethnographic Archive' conference, held at Durham University in September 2016; I am grateful to the panelists and audience, particularly Sharon Hutchinson, Martina Santschi and Cherry Leonardi, for their comments and suggestions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding

This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council under a doctoral scholarship award [number 000419530]; and by the Institute for Hazard, Risk and Resilience, Durham University, under a small grant [number 220166].

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